BY ORDER OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

AIR FORCE POLICY DIRECTIVE 31-1

1 AUGUST 1995

Security

PHYSICAL SECURITY

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Air Force warfighting resources are susceptible to theft, damage, or destruction in both peace and war. The Air Force must secure its aircraft, munitions, weapon systems, and command, control communications, space, and intelligence resources to ensure they are available when needed. This directive provides guidance to deter, detect, and defeat hostile acts against US Air Force priority resources. In addition, it helps Air Force leaders make sound resource allocation decisions to achieve these goals. The objective of this policy is to achieve a reasonable degree of security relative to the importance and value of priority resources.

SUMMARY OF REVISIONS

This revision incorporates changes in the metrics used to assess the effectiveness of prescribed policies (atch 1), requires the collection and reporting of new data (paragraph 1.8, ref., AFI 31-101, Vol I), groups responsibilities together, and updates information concerning implementing directives. A │ indicates revisions from the previous edition.

1. Security plans will consider both peacetime, and advanced threat environments. An appropriate level of security must be provided at home stations and deployed locations. Security arrangements will be regularly exercised, reviewed, and evaluated.

2. Security forces will be trained and equipped to detect possible hostile acts, discriminate between hostile and non-hostile occurrences, initiate an alarm, and deny hostile forces the ability to damage or destroy priority resources.

3. Headquarters US Air Force will assign security priorities and approve security standards based on the importance of each system to the mission.

   3.1. Resources designated priority "A" will be provided a level of security that results in the greatest possible deterrence against hostile acts. Failing deterrence, security measures will provide all reasonable means to achieve detection, interception, and defeat of a hostile force before it is able to seize, damage, or destroy resources. Security positions for nuclear resources must be manned.

3.2. Resources designated priority "B" will be provided a level of security that results in a significant degree of deterrence. Failing deterrence, the level of security will ensure a significant probability of detecting, intercepting, and defeating a hostile force before it is able to damage or destroy the resource.

3.3. Resources designated priority "C" will be provided a level of security that results in a reasonable degree of deterrence. Failing deterrence, the level of security will ensure the capability to impede a hostile force and limit the damage done to the resource.

4. Electronic security systems that increase security levels should be used to improve security and reduce risk in addition to or in place of security force manpower.

5. Negotiators of nation-to-nation agreements will use this directive to ensure security provided to resources is at least equivalent to that provided at US bases.

6. The following responsibilities and authorities are established:

6.1. All Air Force personnel, including civilian employees, will be trained to detect and report potential hostile acts.

6.2. HQ USAF/SP establishes physical security policy for US Air Force priority resources and approves the use of electronic security systems.

6.3. Major commands (MAJCOM) and Air Reserve components (Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve) will establish security programs consistent with this PD, AFI 31-101*, Vol I, The Physical Security Program*, AFI 31-101, *Vol II, The Air Force Nuclear Security Program Standards*, and related security publications. MAJCOMs possessing priority resources will propose system security standards and priority designations specifying manpower, facilities, and equipment requirements. After Air Staff coordination, HQ USAF/SP will designate priorities for resources.

6.4. Installation commanders, through the chief of security police will develop security plans for their installation and deployment locations. Installation chiefs of security police with priority resources will establish a security deviation program to document deficiencies, assess compensatory measures, and monitor corrective actions.

7. This directive implements DoD Directive 3150.3, *Nuclear Force Security and Survivability (S2),* August 16, 1994; DoD 5200.8-R, *Physical Security Program*, May 1991; and DoD 5210.41-M, *Nuclear Weapon Security Manual*, April 1994.

8. This PD interfaces with various publications. Related policies are included in USAFINTEL 201-1*, The Security, Use, and Documentation of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)*, 1 May 1990 (copy available from the supporting Special Security Office); Defense Intelligence Agency Manual 50-3*, Physical Security Standards for Construction of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities*, 19 February 1990 (copy available from the supporting Special Security Office); AFR 207-4/AR 190-16, *Physical Security*; and AFI 31-101, Vol I and II (formerly AFR 207-1, AFR 207-2, AFR 207-6, AFR 207-7, AFR 207-8, AFR 207-21, and AFR 207-23).

9. Metrics used to measure policies established by this directive are at Attachment 1.

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Attachment 1

MEASURING AND DISPLAYING COMPLIANCE WITH POLICY

A1.1. Effectiveness and Compliance with Air Force physical security policies will be assessed by measuring incidents involving unauthorized access and damage to priority resources.

A1.1.1. The measurement chart at figure A1 provides a review of unauthorized access to priority resources as cataloged by security priority designation.

A1.1.2. The measurement chart at figure A1.1 displays trends in damage to priority aerospace resources by security priority designations. All reported damage to resources will be displayed.

A1.1.3. Analysis will focus on both unauthorized access breaches and damage trends. Specific cause factors and possible mitigating elements will be assessed with particular emphasis on whether cataloged deficiencies reflect a trend in the areas of facilities, post/patrol, equipment, procedures or other related areas of interest that can be isolated.

A1.2. Data provided will be evaluated semiannually, and can be transmitted by message or E-mail. Reporting will be discontinued during emergencies. Measurement data will be provided by the MAJCOMs to HQ USAF/SP via RCS: HAF-SPO(SA)9221, Physical Security Deficiencies Report.

Figure A1.1. Sample Metric of Unauthorized Access to Priority Resources.

UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO PRIORITY RESOURCES

Figure A1.2. Sample Metric of Damage to Priority Aerospace Resources.

DAMAGE TO PRIORITY RESOURCES